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1. Introduction 
Michael Munger and Mario Villarreal-Diaz promote an interesting and provocative thesis: does 
capitalism have an inbuilt tendency toward cronyism? If so, as they point out, capitalism may 
be its own gravedigger after all, as Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi had 
previously pronounced, albeit using very different arguments. 
Munger and Villarreal-Diaz argue that the very success of capitalism creates the temptation 
and potential for large businesses to lobby the state to protect their gains and their position from 
sustained market competition. As they note, Marx made a similar point. Leftists such as Guy 
Standing (2017) have lambasted such “corruption” within modern capitalism using a similar 
logic. 
A second dimension to Munger and Villarreal-Diaz argument concerns the role of 
democracy. They asked: “does capitalism in a democracy always devolve into corporatist 
cronyism?” While noting the similar argument developed by Mancur Olson (1982), they wrote:  
If prosperity enables democracy, and the access to coercive powers of democracy allow 
businesses to concentrate their power and obtain state protection from competition, the 
result is cronyism. … In a democracy, the problem is particularly acute. … We are simply 
pointing out that allowing real democracy may doom real capitalism, just as many 
opponents of capitalism have argued. 
I turn to Olson first. His argument has come under much critical scrutiny, although today his 
work is often unduly neglected. Olson (1982) argued that democracy can empower special-
interest groups that increase institutional sclerosis. Jac Heckelman (2007) reviewed 53 attempts 
 - 1 - 
to test the effect of institutional sclerosis on economic growth. Some attempts were case studies, 
others involved quantitative comparisons. 57% per cent of the studies supported Olson’s 
institutional sclerosis hypothesis, 23% reported mixed support, while the remaining 20% were 
unsupportive. On balance, the theory concerning growth-retarding effects of institutional 
sclerosis had substantial but not universal support.  
Institutional sclerosis is not the same as cronyism, although the mechanisms involved may 
be similar. The common thread in the arguments of Olson and Munger and Villarreal-Diaz is 
the idea that democracy enabled the development and empowerment of interest groups that 
gained influence over politicians and the state machine.  
It may be argued, however, that influence by powerful actors over the political process is 
possible in authoritarian as well as democratic regimes. Olsonian institutional sclerosis may 
happen, but it may not be confined to democracies. Does democracy help or hinder institutional 
sclerosis? Here the evidence is less clear.  
For example, in a regression analysis of sixteen OECD countries with data from 1870 to 
1987, Hodgson (1996) confirmed some Olsonian hypotheses, particularly the effect of major 
political disruptions in recasting institutions. But the analysis also found that democracy was 
positively rather than negatively associated with economic growth. Although the literature on 
the effects of democracy on economic growth gives mixed results, some studies report a 
positive correlation (Gerring et al. 2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005; Acemoglue at al. 2014). 
Cronyism and Democracy: Some Evidence 
The only attempt to measure cronyism across leading economies, of which I am aware, is a 
“crony capitalism” index published by the Economist (2014). It covers 23 countries, including 
China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK and US. As an index it has come under some 
criticism, but it seems that it is the best we have.  
Figure 1 relates the Polity IV democracy index for 2013 to the Economist’s cronyism ranking 
(Center for Systemic Peace 2016). Note the weak positive correlation between the democracy 
index and the numerical value of the cronyism rank. Higher-ranked crony capitalisms have 
lower numerical values, so this diagram shows a weak negative relationship between 
democracy and cronyism. The highest ranked crony capitalisms shown on the figure are Russia, 
Malaysia, Ukraine and Singapore, all of which have a democracy index of 6 or less. If there is 
a meaningful correlation at all, cronyism seems inversely related to democracy and economic 
development.0F1 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Economist (2014) had Hong Kong as the highest-ranking crony-capitalist country. But because there is no 
information for Hong Kong in the Polity IV data for democracy, it does not appear in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Crony Capitalism and Democracy 
Cronyism rank is from The Economist (2014); Democracy Index is from Center for Systemic 
Peace (2016). Table below figure lists countries at each democracy index column 
 
 
Corruption and cronyism are not the same, but they are related, and they are likely to be 
positively correlated. Organizational corruption means breaking laws or other established rules, 
in public or private institutions (Miller 2005, Hodgson and Jiang 2007). Figure 2 uses data from 
Transparency International (2016) on perceived levels of corruption in 158 countries. These 
data are related to the Polity IV data on levels of democracy for 2016. There is a slightly 
significant and mildly positive correlation between the corruption perceptions index and 
democracy. 
But note that Transparency International constructs their corruption perceptions index so that 
the more corrupt countries have a lower score. Hence Figure 2 shows a negative correlation 
between democracy and corruption. The five countries that are perceived as the most corrupt, 
namely Afghanistan, North Korea. Somalia, Sudan, and Syria, have democracy levels of 1, 0, 
5, 0, and 0 respectively.  
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Figure 2: Corruption and Democracy 
Corruption Index is from Transparency International (2016); Democracy Index is from Center 
for Systemic Peace (2016).  
 
 
In sum, the evidence to hand does not support the contention that democratic regimes enable 
corruption or cronyism more than authoritarian states. There are several possible reasons why 
this may be so. Although perhaps facilitating corruption and cronyism in some ways, 
democracy allows more protest against them. Actual or possible public protest could influence 
politicians who depend on popular votes. Democracy can also help to foster countervailing 
power, which can open up social orders, keep them more fluid, and keep ruling cliques in check 
(North et al. 2009). Democracy is not without its problems, but its effects on cronyism do not 
work in one direction only. 
To reveal the complexities involved, we need to take a historical look at the development and 
interaction of markets, the state and political cronyism. 
In the Beginning there was Cronyism 
Before the rise of general systems of state law, cronyism was the normal way of getting things 
done. Studies of primate behavior suggest that our simian ancestors formed groups and 
coalitions to influence leaders or take over power (De Waal 1982). Primate groups stick 
together by doing each other favors. You pick off my fleas – I’ll pick off yours. Preference in 
doing favors is typically given to closely-related kin. Hence cronyism is an everyday occurrence 
among primate bands. Members of the human species have always relied on family members, 
close relatives or trusted allies to do deals and help them make their way in the world. Even 
today, much business throughout the developed and underdeveloped world, is facilitated by 
using the ties within families, clans or ethnic groups (Landa 1994). 
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“In the beginning there were markets” are the much-quoted words from a much-cited book 
by a later-to-become Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson (1975, p. 20). A problem with this 
statement is that it takes for granted the social and institutional rules that are required to 
establish meaningful property, and to establish, verify and enforce contractual exchange. 
Williamson wrongly suggested that markets are the universal ether of human interaction, but 
he did not take into sufficient consideration the institutional character and prerequisites of 
markets themselves. 
There is a large literature on the actual or possible emergence of contract-enforcement 
mechanisms through private ordering, rather than via the state. For example, Avner Greif (1989) 
pointed to the case of medieval Jewish traders in the Mediterranean. To maintain the reputation 
of this ethnic group, its leaders ensured that contracts with outsiders and insiders were enforced 
fairly. Others point to the medieval private courts of the “law merchants” (Milgrom et al. 1990). 
In this case the court itself would establish a reputation for fair enforcement. But these courts 
declined in number and were eventually absorbed or replaced by state legal institutions and 
enforcement. A major reason for their decline seems to be that they could not cope with the 
increasing scale and complexity of contracting (Hodgson 2015, pp. 77 n., 162).  
Modern, large-scale and global markets require additional institutional supports. Friedrich 
Hayek (1960, 1973) regarded the establishment of general rules of conduct that apply to 
everyone, as key. From a contrasting theoretical perspective, Francis Fukuyama (2011) made a 
similar point, and emphasized the emergence of relatively autonomous state legal systems that 
could constrain the arbitrary powers of monarchs. At the beginning of the modern era, these 
developments were crucial to begin to suppress the endemic cronyism that had marked much 
of the activity of our human and pre-human ancestors for millions of years. 
Like cronyism and corruption, these original sins had to be restrained as we entered the 
modern world of liberal capitalism. These sins did not emerge recently, aided by modern 
freedoms and the flaws of the state. They were there before, and a task of the modern 
institutional order is to keep them in check.  
How was Corruption Reduced? 
We may ask: “what causes corruption?” But following a conversation with Gunnar Myrdal in 
the 1970s, Robert Neild turned the question on its head (Hodgson et al. 2018). Neild pointed 
out that corruption has been “normal throughout history”. And rulers who come to power by 
corrupt means are unlikely to try to eliminate corruption entirely. Neild’s research problem 
became: “when and how was corruption successfully reduced in some countries?” Eventually 
this was to lead to a major historical-evolutionary study, showing why public corruption was 
largely cleaned up in Northern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here Neild 
(2002, p. 6) rejected the idea that the extent of corruption was necessarily correlated with the 
size of government and the march of democracy:  
For example, the reduction of corruption and the great improvement of the quality of 
government in Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century went hand in hand with 
an extension of the scope of government; they were both part of a general wave of reform. 
Neild (2002, p. 6) pointed out that as government becomes more complex, more rules and 
decisions are involved. The degree of corruption is the proportion of decisions made corruptly, 
i.e. by breaking the rules. When relatively uncorrupt governments developed in Northern 
Europe, “new rules were introduced which forbade practices that were previously permitted, 
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and the enforcement of rules was improved.” By contrast, some countries have tried more 
recently to stem corruption by reducing the public sector. Neild explained: 
[A] policy of trying in a heavily governed country to reduce the scope of government, and 
hence the number of rules that have to be enforced, may be accompanied by denigration 
of public service and cuts in its pay and conditions of such severity that, in combination 
with an idealization of private gain, it may produce an increase rather than a decrease in 
the rate of corruption. Russia today is an example. 
Neild then discussed a number of factors that may influence the level of corruption, from 
religion to geography. Neild (2002, p. 13) pointed out that the “establishment of a career public 
service, selected by competition and given security and high status, was the common means of 
reforming the civil and military services in Europe”. A relatively free press in a democratic 
system is also important to expose corruption and campaign for reform. 
Neild treated nation states as the objects of selection in a competitive, evolutionary process. 
Levels of corruption are among the outcomes of this competitive selection. He focused on the 
period from around the late seventeenth century (when public corruption was rife) until end of 
the nineteenth century (when it was much diminished) in the main states of Northern Europe. 
Crucially, during this period, military competition involved mass mobilizations of large 
numbers of trained troops and the support of state bureaucracies. Under these conditions, Neild 
(2002, p. 14) argued that  
[M]ilitary competition between nations has favoured the expansion of the less corrupt vis-
à-vis the more corrupt: those nations that have developed efficient, relatively uncorrupt 
governments have been able to mobilize their resources for war and military domination 
more effectively than the more corrupt and less efficient … 
Clearly military competition is not the only explanatory factor, but Neild argued that it has been 
a major one. The needs of war set up an imperative to gather taxes more effectively and to 
mobilize human and material resources. Combined with the effects of the Enlightenment on 
science and politics, “a combination of domestic and international forces combined to foster 
less corrupt government” (Neild 2002, p. 19). 
Neild then outlined a number of case studies, including Prussia (which eventually dominated 
united Germany), France, the United States and (at much greater length) Britain. He showed 
how competitive evolutionary forces helped to diminish corruption in these countries – albeit 
to different degrees. Neild put the main burden of explanation on selection pressures at the 
national level. He then considered how rules changed within nations in response to the selection 
pressure. 
The conclusions in Neild’s book are pessimistic. Conventional military competition has 
diminished among developed countries since the Second World War. Instead, the form of any 
future military conflict between developed nations would involve high-technology weapons of 
mass destruction, rather than a mobilization of large numbers of troops requiring a relatively 
efficient state machine. Consequently, military competition cannot play the role it formally did 
in reducing corruption. Solutions to the problem of stemming corruption in both the developed 
and less-developed world must be sought elsewhere. 
Crucial here is understanding that, rather than modern intrusions into a market society, 
cronyism and corruption are the default positions. They have been prevalent for much of our 
history and they are still commonplace today. Given this, Neild focused on the exceptional 
cases where cronyism and corruption have been rolled back. 
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On Capitalism and its Impurities 
I now turn to the concept of capitalism. Munger and Villarreal-Diaz acknowledge the value of 
Weberian ideal types in forging such concepts. They also adopt a definition of capitalism by 
Michael Labeit (2009): 
Capitalism is a social system based upon the recognition of individual rights, including 
private property rights where all goods, both intermediate goods and final goods, are 
owned privately. … An economy remains capitalist so long as the government, or any other 
agency for that matter, refrains from intervening coercively in the peaceful private lives of 
citizens. The implications of this fact are substantial: under pure capitalism there are no 
taxes, no price ceilings, no price floors, no product controls, no subsidies to either the rich 
or the poor, no public streets, no public schools, no public parks, no central banks, no wars 
of aggression, no immigration restrictions, etc.. 
For a number of reasons I do not think that this definition is satisfactory. First, in addition to 
establishing an ideal type, the Labeit definition rules out any deviations from this “pure” type: 
“An economy remains capitalist so long as the government … refrains from intervening 
coercively in the peaceful private lives of citizens.” With Weber we all know that real world 
cases never correspond to ideal types in their pure form. But Labeit’s definition requires us to 
conclude that because the pure form of capitalism manifestly does not exist, capitalism does 
not exist. It is a definition of something that does not exist and cannot exist.  
Labeit’s definition is not a workable ideal type because it is unfeasible. But Weber did not 
see ideal types as impossible extremes. For him, the ultimate fruitfulness of an ideal type must 
depend on its success in locating and revealing significant causal linkages in the phenomenon 
under investigation. Each set of ideal types must be deployed and examined with this criterion 
in mind, and then revised accordingly. Weber (1949, p. 105) thus envisaged “a perpetual 
process of reconstruction of those concepts in terms of which we seek to lay hold of reality.” In 
that sense, the ideal type was “real” and “objective”. For an ideal type to be adequate, it had to 
represent an “objective possibility”.  
I argue elsewhere that capitalism without some state interference is impossible. In a large-
scale, complex economy the state is necessary to help protect property, to regulate and help 
enforce contracts, to sustain a viable financial system and to perform other vital tasks that 
cannot be performed spontaneously or by market activity alone. Markets are essential but they 
are not enough (Hodgson 2015, 2018).  
In addition to the state, there are other unavoidable impurities in modern capitalism. Consider 
the rearing of children. Capitalism would no longer be capitalism if all children were owned, 
farmed and produced for profit like slaves. Of course, real-world capitalism has historically 
used slave labor as well as waged labor. But this is yet another case of an impurity. If all labor 
were performed by slaves, then it would not be capitalism. Although capitalism promotes 
markets and profit-seeking activity, it cannot in principle allow the family to be run fully along 
capitalist lines, and still remain capitalist. There are other reasons why markets cannot govern 
everything. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) argued that capitalism would collapse if commercial 
relations became ubiquitous and undermined institutional ties of loyalty and respect. 
The mistaken idea of pure capitalism is also found in Marxism. Karl Marx (1976, p. 90) 
declared in the preface to the first edition of Capital of 1867 that he was following physicists 
by studying the capitalist mode of production in its “most typical form … least affected by 
disturbing influences” and hence closest to its “pure state.” 
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Marx’s theoretical strategy of isolating a “pure” capitalism is flawed and misleading. He 
recognized the empirical existence of impurities, but not their functional role for the system as 
a whole. Hence he concentrated on a single, pure form. He wrongly believed that the dynamic 
of the system could be understood simply by focusing in this pure type. But to the contrary, the 
study of the impurities is necessary to understand the evolution of the system. Because 
impurities of some kind are always necessary, the system can never be self-contained. There is 
no point in constructing ideal types that in principle could never function. 
We need a better definition of capitalism than Labeit’s. I argue elsewhere that we need more 
than the familiar ingredients of private property and markets (Hodgson 2015). If we stick to 
these features alone, then capitalism has been around for many thousands of years. But, 
capitalism is a poor word to describe this immense period of human history. As the word 
capitalism suggests, the system has a great deal to do with capital, which we may interpret in 
the ordinary business and accounting sense as money, or the money value of assets. As 
Schumpeter (1954, pp. 322-3) and others insisted, the term capital should ideally be applied to 
financial assets alone. Schumpeter (1954, p. 78 n.) further argued that a key distinguishing 
feature of capitalism is a developed financial system: 
Owing to the importance of the financial complement of capitalist production and trade, 
the development of the law and the practice of negotiable paper and of “created” deposits 
afford perhaps the best indication we have for dating the rise of capitalism. 
Accordingly, capitalism entails more than private property and markets. It involves a developed 
financial system as well.1F2 In any case, the formulation of the capitalist ideal type has to 
recognize that it is always a combination of different types of structure and mechanism – it 
never comes in a pure form.  
Conclusions 
The problem of crony capitalism is a vital topic for research. The question raised by Munger 
and Villarreal-Diaz, as to whether capitalism has an immanent tendency to cronyism is an 
important one. In doing research for this article I came across a non-academic essay by the 
Marxist writer Jack Farmer (2012) on the same topic. Farmer wrote: “Cronyism, like greed, is 
… a behaviour typically rewarded by the normal workings of the free market.” His argument 
was that there was nothing particularly special about “crony capitalism”:  instead all forms of 
capitalism encourage cronyism. The analytical similarity of Farmer’s point to Munger and 
Villarreal-Diaz’s argument is obvious, although they of course do not endorse the Marxist 
policy of socialist revolution. 
My arguments and conclusions differ from all those described here. Unlike Munger and 
Villarreal-Diaz and Marx in Capital, I do not start from an analytical baseline of “pure 
capitalism”. Although Munger and Villarreal-Diaz, on the one hand, and Marx, on the other, 
differ on the nature of capitalism itself, they all start from the analytical viewpoint of 
commodity exchange – a “pure” market economy. But other writers, notably Williamson 
(1975), differ from Marx in treating markets as the original or universal ether of all human 
interaction. It is unclear whether Munger and Villarreal-Diaz would agree with Marx or 
Williamson on this point. 
                                                 
2 There is also a case to follow Marx and accept wage labour as an important feature of capitalism (Hodgson 2015). 
But that need not concern us here. 
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In any case, I argue instead that cronyism has much greater longevity than markets: it extends 
back to our simian ancestors. Trade in some form has been in existence for tens of thousands 
of years, but cronyism goes back millions of years. Consequently, cronyism and corruption are 
not recent impositions on a market economy, having been caused by large corporations, 
democracy, or whatever. Instead they are longstanding aspects of the human condition that may 
be restrained in the modern era only, after the rise of modern, relatively autonomous, systems 
of state law.  
Consequently, although the task may have become difficult, and other remedies must be 
found, history demonstrates that it is possible to roll back cronyism and corruption with 
capitalism. We need further case studies to develop policies to that end. 
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